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Purbaugh and Burnside: Judicial Reform in West Virginia: The Magistrate Court System

JUDICIAL REFORM IN WEST VIRGINIA: THE
MAGISTRATE COURT SYSTEM*
With the passage, on November 5, 1974, of the Judicial Reorganization Amendment' to the West Virginia Constitution, a new
era of judicial administration began for West Virginia. Central to
this new judicial article was the unification of the lower state
courts under the general supervision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.' The Amendment mandated the establishment of a magistrate court system,3 replacing the system of justice
of the peace (J.P.) courts used in the Virginias since 1661.1 This
article will examine and evaluate the legislative implementation
of the magistrate courts system,5 discuss differences between the
J.P. system' and the magistrate system, and offer some suggestions
for effective advocacy in magistrate courts.
THE MAGISTRATE COURT ACT'7
I.

COURTS AND OFFICERS: ARTICLE I

A. Creation and General Provisions
Article one of new chapter fifty of the West Virginia Code
*

Copyright © 1977 by John C. Purbaugh and Robert A. Burnside, Jr.
The Judicial Reorganization Amendment of 1974 completely rewrote article

VIII of the West Virginia Constitution, substituting new sections 1 to 15 for the
existing sections 1 to 30. The Amendment also altered article III, section 13, and
added sections 9 to 13, which incorporate much of sections 23, 24, 26 and 29 of the
repealed article VIII, to article IX.
A somewhat similar amendment failed to receive support from the required
majority of voters in the state in 1940. See Silverstein, Small Claims Courts Versus
Justices of the Peace, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 241 (1956), and Carlin, The Judiciary
Amendment, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 220 (1939), for discussions of this amendment.
W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3 provides, in pertinent part:
The Court shall have general supervisory control over all intermediate appellate courts, circuit courts, and magistrate courts. The chief justice shall be the administrative head of all the courts ....
W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, § 10 provides, in pertinent part:
The legislature shall establish in each county a magistrate court or
courts with the right of appeal as prescribed by law ....
Note, The Justice of the Peace in Virginia: A Neglected Aspect of the
Judiciary,52 VA. L. REv. 151, 157 (1966).
'W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-1 to 50-6-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-1 to 50-19-9 (1966) (repealed 1976).
Hereinafter cited as "The Act." It is suggested that volume fourteen of the
W. VA. CODE ANN. (1976 Replacement Volume) be consulted throughout the reading
of this article. Citations to the justice of the peace statutes are prefaced by "former"
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provides for the creation of magistrate courts, a magistrate's term
of office, the amount of the filing fee for election, and specifies
applicable voting procedures. 8 The number of magistrates per
county is dependent upon population as determined by the most
recent census,9 as is the salary of a magistrate.' 0 Provision is also
made for the filling of vacancies in office," the offices of magistrate
clerks'2 and magistrate assistants'3 and their respective bonds,'4
and the location of magistrate offices.' 5
B.

Court Administration and Transition From J.P. Courts

The intent of the Judicial Reorganization Amendment is most
clearly reflected in those provisions of article one which delineate
the administrative structure of the magistrate courts system and
chart the transition from justice of the peace courts to magistrate
courts.
Consistent with the desire for a unified system of courts in
West Virginia,'" the Supreme Court of Appeals is authorized to
and are found in the body of the 1976 volume. Citations to the magistrate statute
are prefaced by "new" and are found in the pocket part cumulative supplement to
the 1976 volume.
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The legislature was given
the option, in implementing the Judicial Reorganization Amendment, to require
that the election of magistrates be nonpartisan. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10. This
was not done.
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-2 (Cum.Supp. 1976).
0 Justices of the peace were originally paid under a fee system, which was
declared unconstitutional in State ex. rel. Reece v. Gies, 198 S.E.2d 211 (W. Va.
1973), and State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974). Former
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-19-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975) changed J. P.'s from a fee system
to salary. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10 provides, in pertinent part:
No magistrate or any officer of a magistrate court shall be compensated
for his services on a fee basis or receive to his own use for his services any
pecuniary compensation, reward or benefit other than the salary prescribed by law.
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976) specifies the amount of a
magistrates' salary.
" New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,2New W. VA. COD ANN. § 50-1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'3 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-9 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"New W. VA. COD ANN. § 50-1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'5 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The clear intent of the
legislature, as expressed in this section, was to establish and maintain magistrate's
offices where they would be most accessible to the public, as determined by population dispersion and other factors.
11Berry, A ProposedNew JudicialArticle for West Virginia, 76 W. VA. L. REv.
481 (1974).
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promulgate rules to carry out the intent of the Act."7 This section
also clearly indicates the supremacy of the supreme court's rules
over any other rules promulgated by lower courts," in keeping with
the felt need for the magistrate courts to be ultimately and directly
responsible to the Supreme Court of Appeals in an administrative
as well as a judicial context. This administrative structure is bolstered by the addition of "willful violation of this chapter or any
rule, regulation or order provided for in [chapter fifty] '"' to the
grounds provided by constitution" and statute2' for impeachment
of a constitutional officer. Through its rules, the Supreme Court
of Appeals may also censure or temporarily suspend any magis22
trate .
23
Magistrates must abide by the Code of Judicial Conduct,
and may not acquire or hold an interest in matters before the
magistrate court, purchase property sold as a result of magistrate
court action, represent anyone before a magistrate court, or conduct any moneymaking activities on the magistrate court office
premises.21 Violation of these provisions is a misdemeanor, with a
fine as penalty, and voids "[a]ny judgment rendered involving
conduct in violation of this section . . .

The chief judge of each circuit court may appoint a magistrate
as chief magistrate of the county, with the duty to coordinate all
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-16 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
, W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 6, gives circuit courts general supervisory control over
all magistrate courts in the circuit, subject to the ultimate authority of the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
"New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'T

art. 4, § 9.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-6-3 (1966).

20 W. VA. CONST.
'

New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" Code of Judicial Conduct; adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals, Dec.
20, 1972; effective Jan. 1, 1973. A copy appears at W. VA. CoDE ANN. Vol. 1,
Appendix (1973 Replacement Volume).
"' New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976). W. VA. CONST. art. 8,
§ 7, allows magistrates who are licensed to practice law to do so except insofar as
it violates the proscriptions of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This
apparently allows a magistrate-attorney to practice law except while on the premises of the magistrate's office. One commendable result of this lenient provision
may be the encouragement of attorneys to seek the office of magistrate. Abuses of
the dual occupation limitations, either in time allocation [W. VA. COD ANN. § 501-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976), specifies the time to be devoted to magisterial duties] or
otherwise, can be remedied by an administrative ruling from the circuit court judge
or the chief judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals.
2 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
2
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docketing and reporting procedures." The flexibility inherent in
this section will allow each county or judicial circuit to tailor a
local magistrate court administrative structure to fit its needs and
should be geared to provide a clear conduit between individual
magistrates, the chief magistrate, the circuit court, and the Supreme Court of Appeals. Such a conduit is essential both for the
transmission of administrative rulings to the magistrates from the
supreme court, and for feedback from the magistrates themselves
on the practicalities and implementation of rulings.
Because of variance in caseload from one magistrate to another, both within and between counties, it is important that magistrates be able and willing to serve temporarily in another jurisdiction where an increased caseload demands their assistance. A
magistrate may be ordered to serve temporarily at another location
within his home circuit by either the chief judge of the circuit court
or the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals? Such a
temporary assignment cannot exceed sixty days per year without
the magistrate's consent, and any possible challenge to such a
transferred magistrate's jurisdictional authority while in another
county is avoided by a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction and
authority equal to that in his home county.?
The transition from justice of the peace courts to magistrate
courts is accomplished by both constitutional and statutory provisions, by which the new system became effective on January 1,
1977.2 As a part of the transition, the office of constable is abolished, and constables' duties are assumed by deputy sheriffs."
Among these duties are serving as bailiff in magistrate courts and
serving process in the same manner as provided by law for the
service of process from circuit courts. 1
Central to the orderly transition from justice of the peace
courts to magistrate courts is the portion of the Act which exempts
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-7 (Cure. Supp. 1976).
Circuit judges may similarly be assigned to another circuit for temporary
duty. W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, § 3.
21 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2' W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 15; new W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-15 (Cum. Supp.
2

1976).
1 New W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-15, 17 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Section 17 further
provides that the words "justice of the peace" or "justice" shall be construed to
mean "magistrate" beginning January 1, 1977.
11New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-14 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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for life any justice of the peace who served for at least one year
prior to November 5, 1974, from the qualifications required of all
new candidates for magistrate."
I1.

JURISDITION AND AUTHORITY: ARTICLE

A.

2

Civil Jurisdiction, § 50-2-1

Magistrates are granted the power to determine questions of

fact or law if the questions fall within certain prescribed categories.
The specific inclusions of this section are:
1. Civil actions in which the value of the property or the
damages sought is $1500 or less;
2. Cases involving unlawful entry or detainer, except where
title to real property is in dispute; and
3.

Actions on bonds given pursuant to chapter fifty.

Cases decided under the statute which granted jurisdiction to
justices of the peace,33 using language quite similar to the present
grant of jurisdiction to magistrates, impose additional qualifications and limitations on the jurisdiction of magistrates. The plaintiffs demand cannot be split into separate, smaller claims in order
to bring it within the jurisdictional limit,34 but the amount over the
limit can be released to gain jurisdiction. 5 Multiple claims need
not be joined and demand made in one complaint, so separate
actions may be maintained for separate notes" or checks." The
2 W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10, and new W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-4 (Cum. Supp.
1976), both contain the "grandfather clause" exemption. That constitutional provision also provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he legislature shall not have the power to require that a magistrate
be a person licensed to practice the profession of law, nor shall any justice
or judge of any higher court establish any rules which by their nature
would dictate or mandate that a magistrate be a person licensed to practice the profession of law.
Magistrates must, however, complete a course of instruction in principles of
law and procedure before assuming office, and must also attend continuing educational courses. New W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 50-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
Hale v. Weston, 40 W. Va. 313, 21 S.E. 742 (1895).
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976), analogous to former
§ 50-2-7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
18McDowell County Bank v. Wood, 60 W. Va. 617, 55 S.E. 753 (1906).
3 Pocohontas Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Gillespie, 63 W. Va. 578, 60 S.E. 597
(1908).
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jurisdictional amount is to be determined exclusive of costs and
interest.
The grant of jurisdiction over actions of unlawful entry and
detainer apparently refers to W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-3-1 et seq.
(1966). Since old chapter fifty, which contained its own section
dealing with unlawful entry and detainer, was repealed by the
Magistrate Courts Act, the limitation on § 55-3-1, that it applies
only to courts of record, must be considered implicitly repealed by
the provisions of new chapter fifty. 9 Although the jurisdictional
limit of $1500 is stated in a separate, unconnected sentence from
the grant of jurisdiction in actions of unlawful entry and detainer
and the grant concerning actions on bonds given under this chapter, the jurisdictional limit is still applicable to these two types of
actions 0
The jurisdiction over bonds given pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter does not refer to the bonds required of the magistrate assistant and magistrate court clerk. 4' Jurisdiction is granted
over civil bonds required of a nonresident plaintiff," of any party
who appeals in a civil case,43 and, in cases seeking the enforcement
of liens, or indemnifying, suspending, and forthcoming bonds."
This section and the section on criminal jurisdiction45 incorporate by reference other grants of jurisdiction contained in other
statutes. 6 The Act confers jurisdiction concurrent with circuit
' Moore v. Harper, 42 W. Va. 39, 24 S.E. 633 (1896).
3' See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-2-10(cc) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
0 This result is required by that part of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-11 (Cum.
Supp. 1976), which provides:
If at any time a magistrate determines that an action involves. . . an
amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the magistrate court, the action
shall be dismissed without prejudice.
See also State ex rel. Honaker v. Black, 91 W. Va. 251, 112 S.E. 497 (1922); State
v. Lambert, 24 W. Va. 399 (1884).
' See White v. Conley, 108 W. Va. 658, 152 S.E. 527 (1930).
New W. VA.CODE ANN. § 50-3-5 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-6-1 et seq. (1966), are expressly applied to the enforcement of magistrate court judgments by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
4 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" These include, but are not necessarily limited to:
§ 5-1-9 Extradition Proceedings
§ 8-28-5 Jurisdiction, Concurrent with Circuit Courts, of Municipal
Traffic Offenses Occurring Within One Quarter Mile of a Municipal Airport
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§ 8-29-9 Regional Airports
§ 11-15-29 Consumer Sales Tax
§ 11-17-19 Cigarette Tax Act Violation
§ 15-1F-9 National Guard
§ 15-3-9 Misuse of Police Communications
§ 16-2A-10 Local health organization, interference
§ 16-4-26 Control of Venereal Disease
§ 17-16A-15 Defrauding Turnpike Commission, Trespass
§ 17-19-15 Roads and Highways
§ 17A-11-3 Motor Vehicle Chapter-Jurisdiction of All Misdemeanors
§ 17B-5-2 Operators and Chauffeur's Licenses
§ 17D-6-5 Safety Responsibility Law
§ 18-11-25 Parking Offenses at West Virginia University Campus
§ 19-18-12 Driving Livestock by Non-resident on Lands of State Resident
Without Permission
§ 19-20-18 Killing Dog for Destruction of Livestock
§ 20-7-10 Motor boating
§ 21-2-14 Employment Agencies
§ 21-3-14 Labor-Safety and Welfare of Employees
§ 21A-10-13 Unemployment Compensation
§ 24A-7-4 Complaints Against Motor Carriers
§ 29-2-3 Interference with or Destruction of Monuments Used in Geological Survey
§ 30-17-8 Sanitarian
§ 34-1-1 Estrago, Drift and Derelict Property
§ 37-5-3 Excavations Near Boundaries
§ 47-1-37 False Weights and Measures
§ 48-7-1 Maintenance of Illegitimate Children
§ 48-8-2 Desertion of Non-support of Wife or Child
§ 51-3-3 Watercourses
§ 51-10-10 Professional Bondsmen
§ 55-9-2 Proper Recovery of Property Lost in Gambling
§ 60-6-18 Issuance of Search Warrants
§ 61-8-5 Houses of Ill Fame and Assignation
§ 61-2-25 Dueling
§ 61-10-27 Engaging in Work on Sunday
§ 62-10-1 Peace Bonds
§ 62-10-7 Offenses Committed in the Presence of a Justice
§ 62-10-8 Special Peace Officers for Fairs
The crime of unlawful assault [W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9 (1977 Replacement
Volume)] presents a peculiar problem of classification. Alternate punishments for
this crime are within the judge's discretion. He may choose to confine the miscreant
in the penitentiary for one to five years or in jail for up to twelve months, plus a
fine. The statute expressly classifies unlawful assault as a felony, but a conviction
under the statute was treated as a misdemeanor for purposes of the statute of
limitations in State v. King, 140 W. Va. 362, 84 S.E.2d 313 (1954). In that case,
the jury returned a conviction of assault and battery after a trial under an indictment charging felonious assault. The conviction was regarded as a conviction for a
misdemeanor and reversed because the indictment was returned after the one-year
statute of limitations, which is applicable only to misdemeanors, had passed. This
suggests that the magistrate has jurisdiction to hear criminal assault cases provided
he sentences the defendant, if convicted, to the lesser of the alternate sentences.
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courts upon justices of the peace and municipal judges to hear
violations of public health offenses47 until January 1, 1977.48 No
mention is made of what happens after January 1, 1977. Apparently, only the circuit courts now have jurisdiction, since magistrate courts gain jurisdiction only through special grants.49 Since
the time of this grant has now expired, the general jurisdiction
courts seem to be the only ones with the power to enforce the
provisions on public health offenses.
Magistrate courts are specifically prohibited from hearing
cases involving determinations of title to real estate, eminent domain, satisfaction of liens through sale of real estate, actions for
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander or libel, or any
of the extraordinary remedies of chapter fifty-three of the Code. 0
B.

Venue: § 50-2-2

Venue of the magistrate courts is the same as that for the
circuit courts. Those sections of the Code which define the venue
for circuit courts are incorporated by reference into the Magistrate
Courts Act.
C.

Criminal Jurisdiction: § 50-2-3

In general, this section confers criminal jurisdiction on the
magistrate for all misdemeanor offenses. The previous chapter fifty
enumerated the misdemeanors over which justices of the peace had
original jurisdiction.5 Certain misdemeanors listed in that section
of the old chapter fifty do not appear elsewhere in the Code as
misdemeanors. 2 It can be argued that such a crime cannot now be
prosecuted in magistrate court because chapter fifty was repealed,
amended and reenacted in its entirety. Any crime that appeared
in the old chapter fifty, but not in the chapter as reenacted, nor
elsewhere in the Code, is no longer a crime prosecutable in magistrate court or elsewhere.0
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'

State ex rel. Collins v. Collins, 143 W. Va. 64, 99 S.E.2d 873 (1957).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
E.g., former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-1(b) (1976 Replacement Volume)

50 New
II
52

(trespass to personal property).
- Cf. State v. Harr, 38 W. Va. 58, 65, 17 S.E. 794, 796 (1893) (no common law
felonies in West Virginia). This can be extended by analogy to misdemeanors.
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The grant to the magistrate of jurisdiction over all misdemeanors significantly increased the power of the minor judiciary.
Except for those crimes in other sections of the Code incorporated
by reference in old chapter fifty,5" the largest fine a justice could
impose for any one crime was fifty dollars and the longest imprisonment, thirty days. 5 Extension of the magistrate's jurisdiction to
include all misdemeanors has, by definition, increased the maximum penalties which the magistrate may impose. Certain misdemeanors are punishable by confinement in jail, as distinguished
from the penitentiary, for up to one year 6 and by fines well over
the previous fifty-dollar ceiling."
III.

A.

COSTS, FINES, AND RECORDS

Costs In Civil Actions: § 50-3-1

Costs are specified for the filing and trying of a civil action,
services enforcing judgments, filing of bonds, taking of depositions,
taking of acknowledgements, and any mailings. " As under the
prior system, " these are required to be collected in advance, and
are included in the amount of the judgment. All costs in civil
actions are forgiven a person who files a "pauper's affidavit.""
B.

Security Bond For Costs: § 50-3-5

The magistrate may, and if the defendant so requests, must
require a security bond for costs in a civil action brought by a nonresident plaintiff. The amount is wholly within the discretion of
the magistrate. These provisions and the remainder of the statute,
relating to collection through the security, are substantially the
same as the procedure under the J.P. system."'
C.

Costs In Criminal Proceedings: § 50-3-2

Unlike the old provision, where a ten-dollar fee was assessed,
whether or not a hearing was held, 2 the new section provides for
11Former

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).

55 Id.
M W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-1 (1977 Replacement Volume).

"7 E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-5 (1966) (involuntary manslaughter).
n New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
5' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-17-18 (1976 Replacement Volume).
5' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1966).
5 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-17-6, 7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
'2 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-17-11 (1976 Replacement Volume).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 7
STUDENT NOTES
the imposition of the same amount only where a hearing is held
and the defendant is convicted. This cost is in addition to the fine,
other statutory costs, or penalty assessed for the offense. 3
Generally

D.

The disposition of fines, forfeitures, penalties,64 and costs,6 5 as
well as records and reports, 6 and audits of magistrate courts,6" are
provided for in this article.
IV.

PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL: COMMENCEMENT
ARTICLE 4

A.
1.

OF ACTIONS:

Civil

Commencement in General: § 50-4-1

The plaintiff must take two steps prior to the commencement
of a civil action in a magistrate court. He must first pay the tendollar filing fee, 6 and second, provide the magistrate or magistrate
assistant with a concise statement, either oral or written, of the
nature of the cause of action.69 When the statement and fees are
received, the magistrate assistant prepares a summons in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals." The date of the summons is the date the request is received
is deemed to commence
and the filing fee collected, and the action
71
on the date affixed to the summons.
The summons and any service of process fees that may have
been collected are forwarded to the magistrate court clerk, 72 who
dockets the case in a central docket and assigns the case to the
magistrate in whose office the action originated. There is a provision for assignment to another magistrate when necessary to maintain an equitable distribution of cases among magistrates, but this
is to be done only when the judge or chief judge of the circuit court
New W. VA.
6' New W. VA.
6 New W. VA.
58 New W. VA.
e New W. VA.
' New W. VA.
' New W. VA.
70Id.
71 Id.
72 New W. VA.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§ 50-3-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
§ 50-3-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
§ 50-3-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
§ 50-3-7 (Cum. Cupp. 1976).,
§ 50-3-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
§ 50-3-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
§ 50-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).

CODE ANN. § 50-3-4 (Cum Supp. 1976).
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determines by rule that such reassignment is necessary.73 This
reassignment for equitable distribution is to be distinguished from
removal from one magistrate to another upon affidavit of a party
that the magistrate is biased or prejudiced."
Under the previous statute, a civil action was commenced "by
summons or by the appearance and agreement of the parties without summons." 5 It is no longer possible to commence an action by
appearance and agreement. The previous statute provided a form
summons, 76 while the present statute provides only that the Supreme Court of Appeals will provide by rule for the contents of the
summons.7 7 Under the old form, a statement of the nature of the
cause of action was included in the summons, which served, along
with a more formal complaint entered at a later stage," to notify
the defendant of the nature of the action. Under the new procedure, there is no complaint other than the statement of the cause
of action filed at the initiation of the proceeding, so it appears that
the only notice the defendant will receive of the substance of the
action will be in the summons."
The statute provides for collection of service of process fees by
the magistrate assistant; these fees are to be distinguished from
the filing fee which is also collected at the commencement of an
action."0 The Act does not provide for a fee for service of process; 8'
rather, the entire procedure for service of process is to be performed
as provided by law for circuit courts." Hence, an effectual commencement of an action in magistrate court requires the payment of
both the ten-dollar filing fee and the three-dollar service of process
fee," unless the plaintiff chooses to avoid the latter fee by having
73Id.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-7 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See part IV(A)(7) of this
article, for further discussion of removal of cases.
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-4 (1976 Replacement Volume).
7 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
7 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-4 (1976 Replacement Volume).
7,New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
, New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-1(a) - (c) (Cum. Supp. 1976), lists the costs

which must be collected in advance by the magistrate assistant.
2New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-14 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3 The fee for having process served in circuit courts is three dollars. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 59-1-14 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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someone other than the sheriff serve process, 4 or by filing a pauper's affidavit.
2.

Manner of Service of Process: § 50-4-4

Under the old statute the constable was charged with the responsibility of serving process.85 A special constable could be appointed to do so if no "duly elected" constable was available,86 a
procedure perhaps analagous to service by a credible person now
provided by Rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
The statute provided for special modes of service on specific types
of defendants." These special rules of service are no longer in use,
having been replaced by a procedure common to all defendants.
Under the new system the office of constable no longer exists.89
The fees previously collected by them for service of process will be
collected by the sheriff. The summons and service of process fees,
if collected, are sent to the magistrate court clerk by the magistrate
assistant who originally received them when the action was commenced. Upon assigning the matter to a magistrate, the magistrate court clerk notes the assignment on the summons which is
then forwarded to the sheriff along with any service of process
fees that may have been collected. The sheriff then serves process. If the plaintiff wishes to have someone other than the sheriff
serve process, he does not submit the service of process fee to the
magistrate assistant." In this event, the magistrate assistant for" W. VA. R. Crv. P. 4(a) allows the plaintiff to direct that someone other than
the sheriff serve process on the defendant. If process is not served by the sheriff,
Rule 4(c) requires that the person serving process be "any credible person who is

not a party" and not the attorney for a party.
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-3 (1976 Replacement Volume).

" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-14 (1976 Replacement Volume).
" See former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-7 (joint defendants); § 50-3-10 (infants);
§ 50-3-11 (domestic corporations); § 50-3-12 (foreign corporations); § 50-3-16 (secretary of state as attorney in fact for any corporation).
"New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,OSee former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-19-6 (1976 Replacement Volume).
90 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
92 Assignment of a case to a magistrate by the magistrate court clerk is discussed in part IV(A)(1) of this article. If the purpose of having someone other than
the sheriff serve process is to avoid paying the three dollar fee, the plaintiff might
consider seeking waiver of fees by use of a pauper's affidavit. If all fees are waived,
the sheriff must serve process without payment of the fee. However, if the plaintiff
does not choose to seek waiver of fees he must arrange for service of process in
accordance with W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(c). See note 84 supra.
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wards the summons without the service of process fee to the
magistrate court clerk, who notes on the summons the magistrate
to whom the case is assigned.2
The summons must be forwarded to the sheriff by the magistrate court clerk with either the service of process fee or a pauper's
affidavit. It would appear that the better procedure where the
plaintiff does not want the sheriff to serve process would be to
return the summons to the magistrate assistant from whom the
summons originated. He would then hold it until the plaintiff obtained it for conveyance to the person who would serve process.
The alternative is to require the plaintiff to go to the sheriff to
receive the summons, a procedure more likely to cause confusion
and delay.
3. Return in Civil Actions: § 50-4-5
The summons gives the defendant a choice in his manner of
response. He can appear before the magistrate within twenty days
of service of the summons upon him or otherwise notify the magistrate within the same period that he wishes to contest the matter. 3
No purpose is served by an appearance by the defendant simply
to notify the magistrate of his intention to contest the matter; an
appearance should be used only if the defendant wishes to file a
counterclaim. 4 The trial date is to be set no fewer than five days
from the defendant's notification unless all parties agree otherwise.
There is no provision in the present statute for a formal answer,
as there was in the previous statute."
4.

COUNTERCLAIMS: § 50-4-9

There are no compulsory counterclaims in magistrate court.
If the defendant commences a separate action against the plaintiff,
the two actions may be tried together if two circumstances are
present: the defendant has commenced his action against plaintiff
within twenty days of service of process on him, and the counter92 New

W.

§ 50-4-1 (Cum.Supp. 1976).
1976).
" New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-9 (Cum.Supp. 1976), discussed in part
VA. CODE ANN.

" New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-5 (Cum.Supp.

IV(A)(4) of this article.
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-4-2, 5 (1976 Replacement Volume).
, New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-9 (Cum.Supp. 1976); compare W. VA. R. Civ.
P. 13(c).
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claim has arisen from the same transaction
or occurrence that is
7
the subject matter of the initial claim.1
The defendant who files a counterclaim must follow the same
steps as he would in filing suit. There are two major differences
between the prior statute and the present one respecting counterclaims. First, a counterclaim was allowed only when the plaintiffs
case was "founded on judgment or contract, express or implied"
and must have arisen from the same contract or transaction."
Other restrictions were applied to the counterclaim,99 but the Act
does away with all these restrictions except the ones mentioned
herein. Second, a counterclaim was mandatory under the previous
statute. If the defendant failed to assert an available and allowable
counterclaim, he was "forever precluded from maintaining any
action for the recovery thereof." This extended 00also to a plaintiff's
counterclaim to the defendant's counterclaim.'
5. Judgment Before Trial: § 50-4-10
If the defendant fails to notify the magistrate of his intention
to contest the action, default judgment may be entered against
him.'"' Such a judgment must be based upon testimony or affidavit
which establishes: (1) the nature of the claim, (2) whether or not
it is for a sum certain or for a sum which by computation can be
made certain,"0 2 and (3) the defendant's failure to contest the
claim.' 3 The magistrate may, for good cause, set aside a default
judgment upon motion by the defendant within twenty days after
entry of default judgment. 0 Under the prior statute, default judgment was to be entered against the defendant if the defendant
50-4-9 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).

9' W. VA. CODE ANN. §
"

, Id.; e.g., limitations on unliquidated counterclaims and counterclaims
against insolvent persons.
'' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-2 (1976 Replacement Volume).
,0, New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Note the provision in
subsection (b) that a default judgment may not be entered against a person who is
an infant, incarcerated convict, or incompetent person unless he is represented by
a guardian ad litem or other representative.
0I If the sum is not certain or cannot be made certain by computation, the
affidavit must further show that the relief sought is appropriate. New W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 50-4-1Q(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'° New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-10(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' Id.
see W. VA. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for suggestions as to what should constitute
good cause. See also M. LUGAR and L. SIIVERSTEIN, WEST VIRGINIA RuLEs 465-71
(1960).
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failed to appear,0 5 but the plaintiff was required to prove his case
to recover against even a non-appearing defendant.' This requirement has survived in a less stringent form," 7 as discussed above.
The default judgment could be set aside within fourteen days after
its entry upon notice to the plaintiff."'0
The magistrate is directed to enter judgment plus costs
against the defendant when the defendant offers in writing to confess judgment. The plaintiff may request that the case be set for
trial if his claim exceeds the amount confessed, but if the plaintiff's actual recovery at such trial does not exceed the amount
confessed, costs are to be assessed to the plaintiff.'00 Under the
previous statute the defendant's offer to confess judgment was
formally served on the plaintiff. The plaintiff could refuse to accept the offer, in which case judgment was not entered, but if the
plaintiff failed to recover a judgment more favorable than the rejected offer, he was required to pay the costs."10
It is clear that the new procedure for confession of judgment
is an improvement over the old. No time is wasted in adjudging a
confessing defendant liable because judgment for the confessed
amount is immediately entered against him. The plaintiff may
require that the action go to trial notwithstanding the entry of
judgment for an amount confessed by the defenedant. The immediate entry of judgment for the amount so confessed appears to
remove from the plaintiff any option to reject the defendant's offer
to confess judgment. If the plaintiff requires a trial and receives a
verdict for less than the amount confessed, the statute does not
provide for entry of judgment for the amount indicated by such a
verdict. The result is that a plaintiff appears guaranteed to receive
a judgment for at least the amount confessed and entered as a
judgment. The only thing he stands to lose if he chooses to proceed
to trial in the face of a judgment already entered for the amount
confessed by the defendant is that costs will be assessed against
him if his recovery does not exceed the amount confessed.
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4 (1976 Replacement
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-3 (1976 Replacement
" New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4 (1976 Replacement
,OO
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-5 (1976 Replacement
'"
'0
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6. Dismissal of Action: § 50-4-12
Dismissal of the action can be with or without prejudice to the
right of the plaintiff to pursue a new action. Dismissal will be with
prejudice if dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the plaintiff
fails to appear and prosecute his action at the proper time, (2) the
plaintiff fails or refuses to testify when properly required to do so,
or (3) the plaintiff fails to give security for costs when properly
required to do so."' The magistrate has discretion to dismiss without prejudice if dismissal is for either
of the first two reasons above,
2
and plaintiff shows good cause.1
Dismissal without prejudice is mandated if the summons is
defective or erroneous and cannot be amended,"' or the plaintiff
requests dismissal before trial."' A counterclaim is not affected by
the dismissal of the primary claim." 5
Under the previous statute, all dismissals of plaintiffs' actions
were without prejudice. 6 In addition to the reasons specified in
the new statute, a plaintiff's action could be dismissed for failure
"to make or file his complaint at or before the time the summons
is returnable,""' a situation which could not arise under the new
statute because the summons and complaint are effectively combined."'
Despite the use of the word "may," the corresponding section
in the previous statute"' was construed as being mandatory. Upon
the occurrence of any of the events that gave rise to dismissal, the
justice of the peace was required to enter dismissal. 21 "May" was
M New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
12 Compare W. VA. R. Crv. P. 41(b). Under that rule, involuntary dismissal
operates as judgment on the merits unless the court orders otherwise.
" See section IV(A)(10) of this article for a discussion of the summons and its
contents.
" Compare W. VA. R. Cv. P. 41(a)(1). The rule applicable in circuit court
requires that the plaintiff request voluntary dismissal before the defendant's answer
or before motion for a summary judgment. There is no answer as such in magistrate
court, nor is there provision for a motion by defendant for summary judgment. The
phrase "before trial" in the penultimate sentence of § 50-4-12 is a somewhat vague
limitation on the plaintiff's right to move for voluntary dismissal.
"
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
"7 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-1(b) (1976 Replacement Volume).
"
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
'
Buena Vista Freestone Co. v. Parrish, 34 W. Va. 652, 12 S.E. 817 (1891).
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construed as "shall" under this section of the old statute and might
be so construed in the new statute. It is possible, however, that the
legislature, being aware of this construction, overruled it by retaining "may" instead of substituting "shall" in the new statute. If the
supreme court's rules governing magistrates do not speak to this,
litigation on the point is likely to arise.
7.

Removal to Another Magistrate: § 50-4-7

Either party in a criminal or civil proceeding can, as a matter
of right, cause the proceedings to be removed once to another magistrate if the first magistrate has a personal bias or prejudice for
or against either party. A form affidavit for this purpose is to be
provided by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The affidavit must be
filed before trial begins, whereupon the magistrate is required to
transfer all matters to the magistrate court clerk for reassignment
to a second magistrate.' 1
There is no provision for removal to another magistrate if the
bias or prejudice is discovered after trial begins. A litigant in this
situation must rely on the availability of a trial de novo to cure any
violation of due process such a situation might produce."' The
litigant is similarly trapped if he discovers that the magistrate to
whom the trial has been removed is also biased or prejudiced,
because removal is available only once to each party.
Removal of civil and criminal proceedings to another magistrate was also permitted under the previous statute for the same
reason and by the same procedure as in the new one.'" In addition,
removal was permitted when the justice had advised or counselled
the plaintiff,24 a reason for removal obviously applicable only to
civil proceedings. It is possible that the legislature omitted this
second reason from the new statute because such advice and counsel to one party is indicative of the personal bias or prejudice for
or against a party that constitutes the general reason for seeking
removal. The change also indicates that removal for this second
reason is available to a defendant or the state in criminal proceedW. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-7 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See the discussion of
appeals from magistrate court in section V(C)(3) and V(D)(2) of this article. See
North v. Russell, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976) for authority that the availability of a trial
de novo is a cure for due process defects in magistrate court procedure.
121Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-33 (1976 Replacement Volume).
12, New
12

124Id.
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ings, becuase the new statute does not differentiate between civil
and criminal proceedings in establishing grounds for removal to
another magistrate.
8. Removal to Circuit Court: § 50-4-8
Removal to circuit court is available in civil proceedings upon
payment of a ten-dollar fee if the action involves more than one
hundred dollars.' 5 There is no corresponding removal to circuit
court for criminal proceedings. This virtually automatic removal
was not available under the old statute.
The availability of this new form of removal is especially significant to a defendants in a civil action. It gives the defendant the
choice of forum previously available only to plaintiffs who could
choose freely whether to bring suit in magistrate or circuit court
in those cases where there is jurisdictional overlap. The defendant
is no longer forced to rely on a trial de novo available only after he
has lost in magistrate court. The trial in circuit court that follows
removal is not a trial de novo because there is no magistrate judgment from which to appeal.' 8 As litigants in an original action in
circuit court, the parties are entitled to use discovery procedures'"
that are not available upon trial de novo following appeal from
magistrate court.'1
9. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction: § 50-4-11
This section applies to both civil and criminal actions. The
determination that a matter is outside the magistrate's jurisdiction may be made by the magistrate at any time, and upon such
determination, the plaintiff's action is dismissed without prejudice.' 2 The plaintiff can unilaterally confer jurisdiction on the
magistrate by forgiving any amount in excess of the fifteen
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The original jurisdiction of
the circuit court does not extend to claims of less than one hundred dollars. It
should be noted, however, that their appellate jurisdiction extends to appeal from
the judgment of any magistrate court. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. The result is
that a trial de novo is available in circuit court for a claim for which the circuit
court does not have original jurisdiction.
"I6New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
M W. VA. R. Cirv. P. 26-37 set out discovery procedures for civil actions.
'
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1).
9 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See section IV(B)(3)
of this article for a discussion of dismissal for lack of criminal jurisdiction.
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hundred dollar jurisdictional limit.1 3 The plaintiff is not empow-

ered to confer jurisdiction where lack of jurisdiction is based on any
factor other than jurisdictional amount.
B.

Criminal

1. Commencement in General: §§ 50-4-2 and 50-4-6
The statute leaves one uncertain as to the procedure for initiating a criminal action. A criminal action is to be commenced by
warrant obtained and executed in compliance with the provisions
of article 1, chapter 62 of the West Virginia Code.' 3' Execution of
an arrest warrant in compliance with this statute is by arrest of the
person named in the warrant,'32 but the new magistrate statute
directs that the defendant "be notified of the return date" when a
warrant is executed in criminal proceedings. ' There is no provision for a return date in article 1 of chapter sixty-two, nor is there
any return date applicable to criminal defendants in the new chapter fifty.' u
This uncertainty as to the manner of execution of an arrest
warrant results in uncertainty as to the moment a criminal action
is commenced. Ascertainment of this moment is especially important when the crime is a misdemeanor, as any crime tried before a
magistrate must be.' Prosecution for a misdemeanor is usually
'" Id. See section 11(A) of this article, discussing the civil jurisdiction of magistrate courts.
"I'A warrant for the arrest of the defendant is obtained by making a complaint
under oath before the magistrate. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-1 (1977 Replacement
Volume). A warrant is issued "if it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant
committed it." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-2 (1977 Replacement Volume). The contents of the warrant are set forth in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-3 (1977 Replacement
Volume).
'3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-4 (1977 Replacement Volume).
'3 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'u It is possible that the legislature intended to provide a simplified procedure
for commencement of criminal actions. Two procedures are suggested:
(1) The officer executes the warrant by arresting the defendant and bringing
him before the magistrate. The magistrate then sets the return date (i.e. trial date)
and hears a request for appointment of counsel if any is made, or for subpoena of
witnesses; or
(2) The officer executes the warrant by issuing a form of citation. The defendant is notified, without arrest, that he is about to be prosecuted and that he must
appear for trial on a given date. On or before that date, he requests counsel and
subpoena of witnesses.
213 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See discussion of
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limited by a one-year statute of limitations'36 which stops running
at the commencement of an action against the accused, 37 which
in magistrate court is at the execution of the criminal warrant. But
if the manner of execution is uncertain, the exact moment of execution is vague; and it becomes quite difficult to ascertain whether
the action was commenced in compliance with the statute of limitations.
2. Appointment of Counsel: § 50-4-3
The magistrate is required to advise a defendant of his right
to counsel and of his right to have counsel appointed only if the
crime of which he is accused is punishable by imprisonment.'3 A
defendant who requests appointed counsel must execute an affidavit that he is unable to afford counsel. 3 The magistrate has no
authority to appoint counsel, and upon receipt of the defendant's
request and his affidavit, the magistrate is directed to stay the
proceedings and forward the request to the judge of the circuit
court. "' The statute operates on the presumption that the circuit
court has established rules for the appointment of counsel in that
if there is no judge sitting at the time of the request, the clerk of
the circuit court must make the appointment according to preestablished local rules.
3.

Dismissalfor Lack of Jurisdiction: § 50-4-11

This section of the statute is applicable both to criminal and
civil actions. A criminal action must be dismissed if the magistrate
determines at any time that the matter is not within his jurisdiction."' If a second criminal proceeding is commenced in circuit
court after the magistrate dismisses for lack of jurisdiction, the bar
of former jeopardy does not apply because jeopardy cannot attach
criminal jurisdiction in section H(C) of this article.
'' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-9 (1977 Replacement Volume) provides that a

"prosecution for a misdemeanor shall be commenced within one year after the

offense was committed, except that a prosecution for petit larceny may be commenced within three years after the commission of the offense." See State ex rel.
Myers v. Wood, 154 W. Va. 431, 443, 175 S.E.2d 637, 645 (1970).
,3, State v. Wiseman, 141 W. Va. 726, 92 S.E.2d 910 (1956).
" New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This provision codifies
the rule of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
"I'New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).

140Id.
"I

New W. VA.

CODE ANN.

§ 50-4-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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in proceedings before a court which is not of competent jurisdiction, regardless of whether a magistrate has heard evidence or a
jury has been sworn.' 42
V.
A.

TRiALs, HEARINGS AND APPEALS: ARTICLE

5

Provisions Applicable in the Same Way to Civil and Criminal
Trials
1.

General Rules of Procedure: § 50-5-1

The Act supplies the procedural background to which one may
refer to fill in the gaps that may exist in the rules for magistrate
courts to be promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals.' The
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure by their own terms apply
only to courts of record,' which does not include magistrate
courts.'45 Notwithstanding the noted provision in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the legislature directed that "provisionsof law relating
to trials . . . in circuit court" shall apply to trials in magistrate
courts.' 4' It can be argued that the Rules of Civil Procedure are
included among those provisions of law, resulting in their applicability to magistrate courts to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this statute or with the rules to be adapted specifically
for magistrate courts.'47 Whether they actually apply in such circumstances is unresolved.
If the magistrate courts are to be a part of a unified court
system, there is good reason to make the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure for Trial Courts of Record applicable to magistrate
courts, except in those areas where the Supreme Court of Appeals
feels that the magistrate court has a unique function requiring
,,2Brooks v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967). E.g., Illinois v.
Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (attachment of jeopardy after a jury has been
sworn); Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933) (attachment
of jeopardy when the judge in a nonjury trial begins to hear evidence).
"4 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'4 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
245

W.

VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10.

New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
,,7There is no constitutional provision that would prevent the legislature from
1,1

directing that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to magistrate courts notwithstanding their failure to make them courts of record. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court of Appeals could undo such legislation by exercise of its rule making
authority granted under article VIII, section 8 of the West Virginia Constitution and
by its statutory authority to supersede, with rules, legislation that is purely procedural in nature. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-4 (1966).
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special rules. On the other hand, if the magistrate system as a
whole serves a special function, even within the notion of a unified
court system, the use of special rules is justified. It is suggested
here that one function of the magistrate court is to provide a simplified system for settling simpler disputes - disputes that require
a final adjudication but that do not require complex procedural
steps toward that end. The use of a special set of rules less complex
than the Rules of Civil Procedure for Trial Courts of Record is not
inconsistent with the establishment of a unified court system.
Moreover, in light of a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, that magistrates need not be lawyers,4 8 and of the
fact that the minimum educational requirement for a magistrate
in West Virginia is a high school diploma or its equivalent,' to
require the magistrate to administer a simpler set of rules seems
quite appropriate.
2.

Subpoenas: § 50-5-4

The statute authorizes two forms of subpoenas in magistrate
courts: a subpoena compelling the attendance and testimony of a
witness; and a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production
of some writing or other object. 5 ' The subpoena must be issued on
request, and the requesting party need not justify that request.",
The sheriff is to enforce the subpoena, and the magistrate is empowered to punish for contempt any person who does not obey a
subpoena.'5
3.

Privileged Communications: § 50-5-5

Communications recognized as privileged in the circuit courts
are to be recognized as such in the magistrate courts. 53 The old
justice of the peace statute accorded a form of privilege to communications between husband and wife, attorney and client, clergyman and confessor, and doctor and patient by declaring the
spouse, attorney, clergyman or physician incompetent to testify to
certain communications made to him.'54 No corresponding statute
North v. Russell, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976).
New W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 50-1-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
11New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"I Id.
"z Id.; see part V(A)(4) of this article.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-10 (1976 Replacement Volume). The privi14
14
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exists for circuit courts, except for one dealing with confidential
communications between husband and wife.' 55
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has long recognized as privileged certain communications other than those
between husband and wife, most notably an attorney-client privilege' 56 and a doctor-patient privilege. ' The significance in the
change of statute is that there is no longer a statutory basis for
claiming these three communication privileges in magistrate
court.
4.

Competency to Testify: § 50-5-5

As noted above, the old statute blurred the distinction between the privilege to withhold testimony as to a privileged communication and incompetency to testify. There is no corresponding
section in the magistrate statute which sets forth specific incompetencies. As with privileged communications, the practitioner in
magistrate court must look to the provisions of law applicable to
trial courts of record to determine competency to testify in magistrate court.
West Virginia has by statute removed most of the common law
testimonial incompetencies. A husband or wife is a competent witness for or against the spouse,' 8 except that in criminal cases one
spouse may be compelled to testify in behalf of the other but may
not be compelled to testify against the other without the consent
of the other.'59 A person convicted of a felony or a perjury is no
longer incompetent to testify, although the fact of such conviction
may be used to impeach his credibility.' An accused is competent
to testify at his own trial,"' chiropractors are competent to testify
leged nature of these communications was recognized under the heading "Persons
Incompetent to Testify," which disregards the distinction between a person's competency to testify and his right or obligation to refuse to testify to a privileged
communication. By casting these as factors rendering the witness incompetent
instead of as forms of privileged communication, what had been a waivable privilege possibly became an incompetency unwaivable by the person benefitting from
the fact of another's incompetency to testify.
,5 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-4 (1966).
'5' M. MARSHALL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA § 59
(1954).
, Id., § 60.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-2 (1966).
' ' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (1966).
"Q W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-5 (1966).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-6 (1966). Note that the accused waives his privi.
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as to matters of chiropractic medicine, 6 2 and no person is deemed
incompetent as a witness on account of race or color.'
The statute known as the Dead Man's Act"' is the vestige of
the general common law incompetency of a person to be a witness
in a case to which he is a party. 6 ' No attempt is intended here to
explore the vicissitudes of the Dead Man's Act"' except to point
out to the practitioner that it is now unquestionably applicable to
magistrate court."'
5.

Contempt: § 50-5-11

The Act enumerates the only acts for which a magistrate may
find one in contempt, and the possible fines or sentences which
may be imposed."'

B.

Provisions Applicable Differently to Civil and Criminal Trials
1.

Continuances: § 50-5-2

Either party, as a matter of right, may obtain on motion one
continuance of from five to ten days. Additional continuances are
available at the magistrate's discretion either by motion of a party
for good cause or at the motion of the magistrate.
In a criminal proceeding, when the defendant is in custody,
the state has no absolute right to a continuance but may be
lege against self-incrimination by voluntarily testifying. However, his testimony
may not later be used against him by virtue of § 57-2-3. Thus,on trial de novo, the
fact that the accused waived his testimonial privilege in magistrate court will not
result in his testimony coming back to haunt him in circuit court. The possibility
of impeachment remains, but the absence of a record from magistrate court, the
presence of hearsay rules, and the general nature of a trial de novo render this
danger slight.
I2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-8 (1966).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-7 (1966).
l W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-1 (1966).
Crothers v. Crothers, 40 W. Va. 169, 20 S.E. 927 (1895); Anderson v. Snyder,
21 W. Va. 632 (1883).
,' See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
578 (3d ed. 1940).
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The existence of enumerated
incompetencies in the old statute (see note 154 supra) suggests that as to justice of
the peace courts that list was exclusive; hence, the Dead Man's Act did not apply.
There has been no known litigation on this point.
WNew W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This list of apts is
identical to that in former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-12-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
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granted one for good cause at the magistrate's discretion. The magistrate may also grant a continuance on his own motion in criminal
proceedings when the defendant is in custody, but only once and
for only forty-eight hours.
Under the old system, either party in a criminal proceeding
was entitled of right to a continuance of ten days if the defendant
had been admitted to bail, but if he had not, only the defendant
was so entitled.'69 The new statute makes no reference to the availability of a continuance when the defendant in a criminal proceeding is not incarcerated. In such an instance, continuances in criminal cases are granted in the same way as continuances in civil
cases, which differed from the old procedure only in that there is
now a five-day minimum on such continuances.7 0
2. Trial by Jury: § 50-5-8
This section is self-explanatory on the existence of a right to
trial by jury in civil actions. The amount in controversy must
exceed twenty dollars or involve possession of real estate, the same
standards applying to civil proceedings under the old statute.,
Any defendant in a criminal action is entitled to trial by jury,
regardless of the potential punishment.' Under the old statute,
trial by jury was available to a criminal defendant if the potential
fine exceeded five dollars or if the crime was punishable by imprisonment. 17 3
A criminal defendant does not waive by silence his right to a
jury trial. He can waive the jury only in writing after he has been
advised of his right to a jury trial. This is a significant departure
from prior law, which treated the defendant as having waived his
right to jury trial where he made no demand."7 There is no mention
"I Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-6 (1976 Replacement Volume), incorporating, by reference, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-9 (1966). Note that under the old
procedure the magistrate could grant a continuance after denying bail, but the
resulting incarceration could be for no more than five days after such grant, which
had the practical affect of limiting the continuance to five days. There is no corresponding limit to length of incarceration while under a continuance except for the
forty-eight hours limitation on a continuance on the magistrate's motion while
defendant is incarcerated.
,' New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'7, Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
272 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
'
Vetock v. Hufford, 74 W. Va. 785, 786, 82 S.E. 1099, 1100 (1914).
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of a need for civil litigants to waive their right to jury trial in
writing, so, presumably, it remains necessary to demand a jury in
a ci;il proceeding or the right will be deemed waived. M The jury
in either a civil or criminal case in magistrate court consists of six
persons. 7 '
Under the old system, the constable was to be commanded by
the magistrate to summon six jurors' 77 who were subject to the
same exemptions as jurors in circuit court."' The same procedure
was followed in criminal cases,'79 except that twenty people were
summoned from whom a jury of twelve was to be composed, 8 ' and
they were sworn differently than in civil cases.' 8 ' The new statute
merely leaves it to the Supreme Court of Appeals to promulgate
rules for the selection and summoning of jurors in magistrate
courts." 2
3.

Judgment: § 50-5-9

The magistrate enters judgment immediately at the conclusion of a criminal trial or hearing, and within twenty-four hours
after the conclusion of other proceedings.' s
4.

Setting Aside Judgment: § 50-5-10

Either party in a civil action, but only the defendant in a
,"I Under the justice of the peace statute, former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-2
(1976 Replacement Volume), the demand in a civil case for trial by jury had to be
made before the justice had examined any witness or heard any evidence.
278 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provided for a jury of six in
civil cases and of twelve in criminal cases. Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-1 (1976
Replacement Volume).
"7 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-5 (1976 Replacement Volume).
R Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
'7' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
Id. "[Flour more names shall be drawn than will be required after each side
has exercised its right to two preemptory challenges."
"I' Id. "[Elxcept that the jury will be sworn well and truly to try the case
between the State and the accused, and to give a true verdict according to the
evidence .....
'

New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-9 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Compare the old

statute, former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-6 (1976 Replacement Volume), where an
immediate entry of judgment was required only when the defendant in a criminal
case was in custody, when judgment was confessed, or when property was held
under attachment. Otherwise, judgment was to be entered within twenty-four
hours.
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criminal action, may move within twenty days of judgment to set
aside judgment. The magistrate may set it aside for good cause and
grant a new trial, and all parties must be given the right to be
heard on the motion.
Under the old procedure, judgment could be set aside within
fourteen days of judgment upon motion by either party when the
trial had been by jury,' or by the defendant when he had lost the
case upon failure to appear,'85 or by the plaintiff when dismissed
for failure to appear. 8 ' Where a civil case had been tried by jury,
the losing party could move within twenty-four hours to have it set
aside, but only on the grounds of "fraud or undue means."'", A
person convicted of a misdemeanor could not seek to have the
conviction set aside under the old statute.'88
C.

Provisions Applicable Only to Civil Trials
1.

GuardianAd Litem: § 50-5-3

An infant, incompetent person, or convict may not sue or be
sued unless by his duly qualified representative, by his next friend,
or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the magistrate. Infants 8 ,
and convicts' are defined by statute.
It is likely that the magistrate will seldom have to appoint a
guardian ad litem. Infants usually have parents or someone else to
sue or defend as next friend; convicts commonly have committees
appointed to manage their property, as do incompetents. However,
should the magistrate determine that such is not the case, he is
empowered to appoint a guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney but need not be, to sue or defend on behalf of the person under
a disability. 9'
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-7 (1976 Replacement Volume).
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-3 (1976 Replacement Volume). When the
defendant failed to appear, the plaintiff was nonetheless required to prove his case.
"' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-1 (1976 Replacement Volume).
"' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-19 (1976 Replacement Volume).
"' Ex Parte Gilbert, 78 W. Va. 658, 659-60, 90 S.E. 111, 112 (1916).
"
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-36 (1971 Replacement Volume). The disability
begins with incarceration and ends upon the convict's release. Nibert v. Carroll
Trucking Company, 139 W. Va. 583, 82 S.E.2d 445 (1954). This statute does not
apply to persons committed to the county jail; it is unlikely that the legislature
intended the magistrate statute to operate any differently.
MNew W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"'

"

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 7

STUDENT NOTES
The practitioner will recall that no default judgment may be
entered against a person who is under any of these disabilities
unless such person is represented by another in the appropriate
fiduciary capacity. 9 ' There is no reason why the party who opposes
the incompetent should not move the appointment of a guardian
ad litem if necessary to protect any judgment obtained in the
proceeding. The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for an insane person in circuit court does not render a judgment void, but
merely reversible, if a meritorious defense to the claim can be
shown.193
2. Evidentiary Depositions:§ 50-5-6
The Act provides for the taking of the deposition of a witness
who resides out of the county or is "unable to attend court." The
prior statute differed somewhat in wording but the provisions were
essentially the same. It allowed the taking of depositions when the
witness resided out of the county, was about to leave the county,
was sick, or was "otherwise unable to attend."' 94 Presumably, a
witness who is sick is to be considered "unable to attend" under
the new statute. It is less certain that a party should be allowed
to take the deposition of a witness who is about to leave the county.
Perhaps it is not always true that such a witness is unable to
attend, but, as a practical matter, such a witness should be permitted to be deposed because of the inherent difficulty of enforcing a
subpoena against a person who is not within the magistrate's territorial jurisdiction.
Since there are no discovery procedures in magistrate court,
the purpose of the deposition is the perpetuation of testimony. The
former statute was more specific on the proper use of depositions
as evidence,'95 the notice requirement, 9 ' and the right to cross
examine the witness at the deposition. 9 ' It is anticipated that
these details will be supplied by the rules to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Appeals.
192New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-10(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"I Beckley Nat'l Bank v. Boone, 115 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1940); Chasman v.
Branch, 72 W. Va. 54, 78 S.E. 235 (1913).
" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-14 (1976 Replacement Volume).
M,Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-15 (1976 Replacement Volume).
"I Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-16 (1976 Replacement Volume).
197Id.
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Appeals in Civil Cases: § 50-5-12

This section of the Act is significantly different from former
article fifteen of chapter fifty. Any person may appeal the judgment of a magistrate court to the circuit court as a matter of right,
regardless of the amount in controversy.' 8 The time in which the
appeal must be requested is increased from ten"' to twenty days"0
after the judgment is rendered or a decision is rendered on a motion to set aside a judgment.
Two important changes have been made in the appeal bond
requirements which should serve to alleviate the often oppressive
bonding requirements in the justice of the peace courts. The double bond (twice the amount of the judgment, plus costs of appeal)
formerly required to be posted for an appeal"' is replaced with a
bond "in a reasonable amount not less than the reasonable court
costs of the appeal nor more than the sum of the judgment and the
reasonable court costs of the appeal ....
The magistrate now possesses the discretion to vary the appeal
bond to best fit the statutory standard of reasonableness in each
individual case, but the bond can never be more than fifteenhundred dollars, plus costs and interest, because that sum is the
jurisdictional limit in magistrate court."' The reputation of the
appellant, his financial situation, and relationship to the community should all be relevant considerations in the magistrate's
determination of "reasonableness." A magistrate's failure to exercise his discretion by refusing to consider relevant factors of reasonableness might be challenged in a writ of mandamus forcing
"I Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15-1 (1976 Replacement Volume) allowed
appeals in civil cases "when the amount in controversy on the trial before the justice
exceeds fifteen dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, or the case involves the
freedom of a person, the validity of a law or of an ordinance of any corporation, or
the right of a corporation to levy tolls or taxes."
"' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15-2 (1966).
2w W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
MzFormer W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15-2 (1966). The double bond on appeal
provision was held to be constitutional in Pattersonv. Warner, 371 F. Supp. 1362
(S.D.W. Va. 1972) and State ex rel. Reece v. Gies, 198 S.E.2d 211 (W. Va. 1973).
But see the joined concurring opinions of Justice Haden, finding the double bond
requirement to violate W. VA. CONSr. art 3, § 17, citing State ex rel. Payne v.
Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770, 776 (W. Va. 1972), and Sprouse, finding the double bond

requirement violative of equal protection.
m New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
1w New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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him to exercise his statutory discretion." 4 The bond requirement
is forgiven entirely for a person who files a "pauper's affidavit""2 5
and for any governmental agency. 0 '
If the appeal is not perfected within twenty days of judgment,
the circuit court may still grant the appeal within ninety days after
judgment if the party seeking the appeal makes a showing of good
cause why the appeal wasn't perfected within twenty days. "Good
cause" can best be given meaning by reference to the cases
construing the corresponding statute for J. P. courts. 2 7 The application within ninety days and the showing of good cause are jurisdictional,"' and the circuit court cannot grant an appeal after
23
ninety days. 1
As in J. P. courts, either the filing or granting of an appeal
automatically stays any proceedings to enforce the judgment, and
a de novo trial is granted in circuit court. °
Provisions Applicable Only to Criminal Trials

D.
1.

Right to Trial in Criminal Cases: § 50-5-7

The Act gives "[e]very defendant charged in a magistrate
court in a criminal proceeding. . . the right to a trial on the merits
in the magistrate court. 2 1 No corresponding provision appears in
the former statute. This section is apparently intended to prevent
an accused from losing his chance at acquittal at the magistrate
"I Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the exercise of discretion by a
public official who has refused to act, but cannot be employed to control or direct
the discretion once exercised. E.g., Wiley v. Mercer County Court, 111 W. Va. 646,
163 S.E. 441 (1932); State ex rel. Buxton v. O'Brien, 97 W. Va. 343, 125 S.E. 154
(1924); cf. United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 970-72 (6th Cir. 1971) (a district
judge's mechanical imposition of a five-year maximum sentence on all draft evaders
without further inquiry into relevant circumstances was held to be a failure to
exercise discretion as required by statute and case law).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1966).
MNew W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15-6 (1976 Replacement Volume) had the
same "good cause" standard as new W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp.
"'

1976). The failure to file for appeal must be the result of fraud, accident, mistake,
or surprise. Powell v. Miller, 41 W. Va. 371, 23 S.E. 557 (1895).
2 Johnson v. Ridgley, 64W. Va. 130, 61 S.E. 42 (1908); Home Sewing Machine
Co. v. Floding, 27 W. Va. 540 (1886).
"9 Worley v. Easley, 123 W. Va. 1, 13 S.E.2d 158 (1941).
210 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-7 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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level. There can be no judgment before
trial in criminal actions,
212
absent a guilty plea by the defendant.

This section may be invoked by a defendant to prohibit the
prosecutor from dropping a criminal action once it has been initiated in magistrate court. The prosecutor might find it preferable
to seek an indictment and trial in circuit court if he becomes certain that the defendant will seek a trial de novo. Under this section, the defendant can demand that the prosecution carry through
with an already initiated trial in magistrate court. The obvious
advantage to the defendant is that the prosecutor might, in an
attempt to secure a conviction in magistrate court, expose parts of
his case that the defendant might never have obtained through the
rather limited pretrial discovery techniques available in criminal
cases.21 3 The defendant may also feel he has a better chance for
acquittal at the magistrate level.
2. Appeals in Criminal Cases: § 50-5-13
Significant changes are also made in the section on criminal
appeals. Whereas under the old statute, the right of appeal was
available if the fine was ten dollars or more, 2" with an absolute
right to have any fine increased to that amount, 15 the Act avoids
this cumbersome device and allows criminal appeals regardless of
the amount of the fine."' The time in which the appeal must be
sought has been changed from "a reasonable time"2"' to twenty
days after sentencing. The application of the code provisions on
bail 218 has been eliminated and replaced with a bond not exceeding
the maximum amount of any fine which could be imposed for the
offense; further, the bond may be on the defendant's own recognizance. A completely new provision allows the granting of an appeal
2 There is no express provision for a guilty plea in the present statute, nor was
there in the prior statute. If a person wishes to plead guilty he should be permitted
to do so under the same procedure as in circuit court. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 623-1a (1966).
213See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1B-2 (1966), and cases annotated thereunder.
See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discovery right guaranteed by the
United States Constitution); United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976) (due
process requirements of pretrial discovery in criminal cases).
211 Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-10 (1976 Replacement Volume).
215 State v. Nangle, 82 W. Va. 224, 95 S.E. 833 (1918).
21' New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976).

" See note 214 supra.
211 W. VA. CODE ANN. 99 62-1C-1 et seq. (1966).
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by a judge of the circuit court within ninety days from sentencing,
and unlike the similar provision for civil appeals," 9 no showing of
good cause is specifically required. As was the practice in justice
of the peace courts, the filing or granting of an appeal automatically stays the sentence, and trial in circuit court is de novo 2 0
VI.
A.

ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENT: ARTICLE

6

Generally, Including Collection of Costs and Fines

West Virginia Code provisions relating to judgment liens, 2"
executions, 222 proceedings in aid of executions, 22 suggestions of salary and wages of persons engaged in private employment,224
suggestions of state and political subdivisions and garnishments
and suggestions of public officers, 22 and indemnifying, suspending
and forthcoming bonds28 are incorporated by reference in the provision on enforcement of judgments except as they conflict with
the Act or clearly apply to courts of record. 22 This is in contrast to
the J. P. system, in which specific provisions were made for suggestions on judgments228 and executions.19
Process to enforce judgments must be issued within twenty
days of judgment and conform to both the incorporated code sections and the rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals. It is anticipated that these rules will determine which, if any, of the incorporated sections cannot apply in magistrate courts.
Execution may be employed by the magistrate to collect fines
and costs levied in magistrate court, and the sheriff must collect
and pay over the monies. 2 All judgments rendered by a magistrate
in the judgment lien
may be filed in the circuit court and docketed
2
books kept for circuit court judgments. '
2,MNew

W. VA.

CODE AN.

§ 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).

§ 50.5-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-3-1 et seq. (1966).
2n W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-4-1 et seq. (1966).

22, New W. VA. CODE ANN.

WW. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5-1 et seq. (1966).
22'W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5A-1 et seq. (1966).
- W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-5B-1 et seq. (1966).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-6-1 et seq. (1966).
- New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
= Former W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-13-13 et seq. (1976 Replacement Volume).
2" Former W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-14-1 et seq. (1976 Replacement Volume).
- New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
= New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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MAGISTRATE COURTS "UNIFY" THE COURT SYSTEM?

The concept of a unified court system was introduced by Roscoe Pound in 190 6 ,13 and has since emerged in several model acts
and has been implemented in varying degrees in several states.23
"Court unification" refers to improvement in both court organization, reflected in the number and jurisdiction of courts, and judicial administration through the exercise of administrative and supervisory power over judicial and non-judicial personnel. In the
simplification of the West Virginia court system,nI the overlapping
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and circuit courtsne has been
significantly changed in the new magistrate courts system. The
jurisdictional amount of the lay-judge courts has increased from
three hundred to fifteen-hundred dollars, 237 and the general jurisdiction of circuit courts has been changed to amounts in controversy exceeding one hundred dollars.21 Many of the inefficiencies
and inequities characteristic of the limited jurisdiction courtsrn
can be eliminated, despite the increased overlap in jurisdictional
amounts, by effective use of certain provisions of the new Act.
22 R. POUND, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, reprinted in 46 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y. 55 (1962).
2 Ashman and Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAuL
L. REv. 1, 2-18 (1974), surveys the evolution of the concept and its adoption by the
states.
' Id. at 24.
W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 5, provides, in pertinent part:

[Elach statutory court of record of limited jurisdiction existing in the
State . . . shall become part of the circuit court for the circuit in which
it presently exists ....
2' Under former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-1 (1966), justice of the peace courts
had jurisdiction of all civil actions for the recovery of money or the possession of
property where the amount in controversy did not exceed three hundred dollars.
Circuit courts had general jurisdiction of all civil actions of a value exceeding fifty
dollars. Former W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 12 (1972).
21 New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-1 (Cur. Supp. 1976).
2" W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 6.

23 E.g. State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628, 630-32 (W. Va.
1974) (discussing the preference of creditors for a certain justice).
[Bletween. . . 1969 and 1973, 874 cases were instituted by the principal
creditors of the area in the court of Justice of the Peace Poteet, while a
total of 49 cases were instituted in the courts of the other five Justices of
the Peace in Greenbrier County . . . . Most significantly, of the above
874 cases the following tabulation appears:
Judgments for the plaintiff [creditor]

874

Judgments for the defendant [debtor]
Id. at 630-31.

0
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One such provision is the right of any party to remove to
circuit court where the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred
dollars.24' This has the practical effect of creating a "small claims
court," within the magistrate court-circuit court overlap. A claim
for less than one hundred dollars can be brought only in magistrate
court; a claim of between one hundred dollars and fifteen hundred
dollars may be brought in either forum. In areas where a particular
magistrate court is "known" to be favorable to creditors, 21 as an
example, defendants in collection suits might be wise to remove
the cause of action to circuit court. An adverse consequence in
some circuits could well be the clogging of circuit courts with cases
previously heard originally in J.P. or magistrate courts. Equally
important is the discretion given to the magistrate in the setting
of bond on appeals in civil cases, as well as the waiver of the bond
if a party files a pauper's affidavit.2 2 Whereas before, many litigants were denied a de novo appeal because of their inability to
pay the bond, these litigants will now be able to exercise their right
to appeal. The resultant increase in appeals may further burden
the circuit courts.
The greatest improvement made by the Judicial Reorganization Amendment and the Magistrate Courts Act has been in the
area of judicial administration and supervisory control over the
courts of limited jurisdiction. The Act gives litigants in West Virginia every right to expect a more responsive and fair judiciary at
the lowest level by providing for centralized supervision of magistrates by the Supreme Court of Appeals,24 creating training programs for magistrates, allowing the temporary reassignment of
magistrates to counter unbalanced case loads, and defining proscribed conduct for magistrates. The necessary mechanisms exist,
and it is the responsibility of every court officer and employee to
ensure that the intent becomes a reality.
John C. Purbaugh
Robert A. Burnside, Jr.
New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
See note 239 supra.
2M New W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 Since the writing of this article, the American Academy of Judicial Education, acting under the direction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
has prepared several publications for use in magistrate courts. Currently available
are: a Bench Book, an Evidence Manual, and a Civil Procedure Manual for West
Virginia Magistrates. These rules have been officially promulgated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
210
211
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